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Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of precautionary foreign reserves in a dollari-
zed economy subject to a sudden stop shock that occurs concurrently with a bank run. 
By including specific features of the Croatian economy in our model we extend the fra-
mework of Goncalves (2007). An analytical expression of optimal reserves is derived and 
calibrated for Croatia in order to evaluate the adequacy of the Croatian National Bank 
foreign reserves. We show that the precautionary demand for reserves is consistent with 
the trend of the strong accumulation of foreign reserves over the last ten years. Whether 
this trend has been too strong or whether the actual reserves are lower than the optimal 
reserves depends on the possible reaction of the parent banks during a crisis. We show 
that for plausible values of parameters, the Croatian National Bank has enough reserves 
to fight a possible crisis of the magnitude of the 1998/1999 sudden stop with a banking 
crisis episode. This result holds regardless of the parent banks’ reaction. We also show 
how use of the two standard indicators of “optimal” reserves, the Greenspan-Guidotti 
and the 3-months-of-imports rules, might lead to an unrealistic assessment of foreign re-
serves optimality in the case of Croatia.
Keywords: sudden stop, banking crisis, dollarized economy, optimal reserves
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1 Introduction
Foreign reserves accumulation is a widespread phenomenon, particularly among emer-
ging economies. Since 1990 emerging markets' foreign reserves have increased by more than 
five times, from 4 percent to over 20 percent of GDP (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 
2008). This practice has raised interesting questions in the literature regarding the reasons 
for such behavior. It has been argued that part of the motivation for the accumulation of 
reserves stems from the mercantilist desire of some governments to maintain undervalued 
exchange rates and bolster the domestic economy. Apart from these exchange rate objec-
tives, which have resulted in rapid reserve accumulations as a side effect, some countries 
have chosen explicitly to build up reserves for precautionary motives or self-insurance aga-
inst exposure to future sudden stops. Aizenman and Marion (2002) and Aizenman and Lee 
(2005) suggest that precautionary demand for reserves played an important role in expla-
ining the rise in foreign reserves in East Asia following the Asian crisis, which was to a 
large extent unexpected.
The need for reserves, acting as a protection against a sudden stop, is even more pro-
nounced in dollarized economies, like the Croatian, where the central bank is exposed to a 
double drain risk (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2008). This twofold risk exists given 
that financial account reversals (an external drain risk) may be accompanied by a loss of 
confidence in the banking system likely to result in a large withdrawal of foreign currency 
deposits (an internal drain risk). Therefore, in a dollarized economy reserves are not only 
an insurance against the negative effects of a sudden stop but also a key tool for managing 
domestic financial instability.
The strong accumulation of foreign reserves has also been apparent in Croatia. Since 
1998 gross foreign reserves of the Croatian National Bank (CNB henceforth) have qua-
drupled. We explore the reasons for the strong accumulation of CNB reserves. One might 
say that a strong inflow of foreign capital in a dirty float of the exchange rate was behind 
the buildup of foreign reserves. However, the question of foreign reserves adequacy is 
still relevant regardless of the exchange rate regime. Providing that the double drain risk is 
present in Croatian economy we analyze whether CNB reserves are sufficient to mitigate 
negative effects of a potential sudden stop of capital inflows and a banking crisis. To tac-
kle this issue we study precautionary demand for foreign reserves in a stochastic dynamic 
general equilibrium model, similar to Goncalves (2007), where central bank holds reser-
ves as self-insurance against a sudden stop and a banking crisis in a dollarized economy. 
By including specific features of the Croatian economy1 in our model we extend the fra-
mework of Goncalves (2007), which develops a model of optimal reserves for Uruguay. 
In the model economy there are two main opposite forces driving optimal accumulation of 
reserves. On one hand, reserves are expensive to hold. The cost of holding reserves might 
be interpreted as the opportunity cost that comes from substituting high yielding dome-
stic for lower yielding foreign assets. On the other hand, reserves absorb fluctuations in 
external payment imbalances, ease the credit crunch and allow a country to smooth con-
sumption in the event of a sudden stop accompanied by a banking crisis.
1 In the same period, the short-term foreign debt of the Croatian economy has almost quintupled, while foreign 
deposits have more than doubled.
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The model is calibrated using Croatian data and simulated to see whether the CNB 
holds more reserves than the model suggests are necessary. We find that for plausible va-
lues of the parameters the model accounts for the recent buildup of foreign reserves in 
Croatia. However, quantitative implications of the model imply that the accumulation of 
reserves has been too strong. In other words, the upsurge of reserves observed in Croatia 
over the past decade seems in excess of what would be implied by an insurance motive 
against a sudden stop and a banking crisis. This result crucially depends on the assumed 
behavior of parent banks during a sudden stop. In working with the data, we assume two 
possible reactions of parent banks during the crisis. Parent banks might withdraw depo-
sits and cut credit lines to banks in their ownership. On the other hand, they might act as 
a lender of last resort by prolonging short-term loans and providing extra liquidity. In the 
benchmark calibration we study optimal reserves in an economy that is hit by a sudden 
stop with a banking crisis on the scale of the 1998/1999 crisis. We find that the CNB is 
holding enough reserves to mitigate negative effects of a possible crisis similar to the one 
that took place during 1998/1999 even if we take into account an adverse reaction of pa-
rent banks. Finally, we compare our formula of optimal reserves with two standard indi-
cators of "optimal" reserves for the Croatian economy, the Greenspan-Guidotti and the 
3-months-of-imports rules. We present advantages of our optimal reserves formula over 
the two standard indicators in assessing adequacy of reserves.
Our framework builds on analytical models trying to characterize and quantify the 
optimal level of reserves from a prudential perspective2, rather than from the cost-benefit 
perspective of reserve accumulation pioneered by Heller (1966)3. The earlier cost-bene-
fit literature focused on using international reserves as a buffer stock, part of the mana-
gement of different exchange-rate regimes. In those models optimal reserves balance the 
macroeconomic adjustment costs that would be incurred in the absence of reserves with 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves4. Although the buffer stock model had the capa-
city to explain the behavior of foreign reserves in the 1980s, the greater flexibility of the 
exchange rates exhibited in recent decades should have reduced reserve hoarding accor-
ding to the buffer stock model (Aizenman and Lee (2005)). Recent welfare-based mo-
dels of optimal reserves as a form of self-insurance had more success in explaining the 
recent hoarding of foreign reserves5. In our welfare-based model, precautionary motives 
for accumulating reserves pertain to the crisis management ability of the government to 
finance underlying foreign payment imbalances in the event of a sudden stop and to pro-
vide foreign exchange liquidity in the face of a bank run. At the same time the government 
is trying to maximize the welfare of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the importan-
ce of the double drain risk for the Croatian economy and describe the episode of banking 
2 See Goncalves (2007), Ranciere and Jeanne (2006), Jeanne and Ranciere (2008), Aizenman and Marion (2002), 
Aizenman and Lee (2005), Caballero and Panageas (2004), Jeanne (2007).
3 See Flood and Marion (2002) for a recent review on the cost-benefit literature.
4 The buffer stock model predicts that optimal reserves depend negatively on adjustment costs, the opportunity 
cost of reserves, and exchange rate flexibility; and positively on GDP and on reserve volatility, driven frequently by 
the underlying volatility of international trade. See Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) for details.
5 See Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2007), Caballero and Panageas (2004), Ranciere and Jeanne (2006), Jea-
nne and Ranciere (2008).
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crisis combined with sudden stop that took place in 1998/1999. In section 3 we present a 
model of optimal reserves together with a calibration of the model, discussion of data, qu-
antitative implications of the model and sensitivity analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Double drain risk and the Croatian economy
We first present a basic national account identity which shows, in a simple manner, 
the mechanism of self-insurance against a sudden stop provided by foreign reserves. Note 
that domestic absorption (of domestic goods), At can be decomposed into the sum of the 
domestic output, Yt, the financial account, FAt, the net factor income from abroad, ITt, and 
the change in foreign reserves, ∆Rt:
At = Yt + FAt+ ITt – ∆Rt (1)
When a sudden stop hits the economy, short-term foreign loans become unavaila-
ble. Hence, a sudden stop brings about a financial account shortfall that reduces domestic 
absorption. If we assume that a bank run (internal drain) also occurs when a sudden stop 
(external drain) takes place, the negative effect will be magnified by a fall in the domestic 
output through the reduction of domestic savings6 and the resulting credit crunch. Howe-
ver, by providing enough foreign liquidity to the economy, the central bank can smooth 
the domestic absorption and diminish the negative effects of a sudden stop combined with 
a banking crisis. Because of the double drain risk, the protective role of reserves is more 
important in dollarized economies. Foreign reserves serve not only as a domestic absor-
ption stabilizer but also mitigate negative effects on output – they provide insurance aga-
inst the risk of external loans not being rolled-over during a sudden stop and help lessen 
a credit crunch by providing liquidity in the event of foreign deposit withdrawal.
We place emphasis on a double drain risk, given that foreign lenders stopped provi-
ding credits to the Croatian economy in the 1998/1999 banking crisis (see Jankov 2000 
for details). Internal drain risk seems to be more important in explaining the slowdown of 
domestic absorption than the financial account reversal during that crisis. Figure 1 shows 
how components of domestic absorption behaved during the banking crisis in Croatia7. 
The crisis began with the failure of Dubrova ka banka and unfolded in parallel with the 
sudden stop in the third quarter of 1998. The financial account reversal was relatively mild 
and lasted for one quarter only. The negative effects of the sudden stop were lessened by 
the release of a part of the foreign reserves.
However, output and domestic absorption continued to fall (until the third quarter of 
1999 – the shaded area in Figure 1). Hence, it seems that the banking crisis, the deposit 
run, and the credit crunch had a dominant role in shaping output and domestic absorption 
behavior during the 1998/1999 episode. Bank activity peaked in the third quarter of 1998 
(at the same time when the sudden stop occurred) after it reached a trough in the second 
6 To see this, remember that Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Xt - Mt = Ct + St + Tt - FAt - ITt + ∆Rt, where Ct, It, Gt, Xt, Mt, St, 
Tt denote consumption, investment, government spending, export, imports, savings and taxes, respectively.
7 The series in Figure 1 are standardized. Hence, Figure 1 does not show the actual decomposition of domestic 
absorption as a sum of its components but provides direction of components behavior.
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quarter of 1999 (shaded area in Figure 2) followed by the end of the real activity slow-
down in the next quarter.
Besides the central bank's foreign reserves, the commercial banks' foreign reserves 
were also important in absorbing the fall in the euro deposits as a result of withdrawals in 
the period from August 1998 until May 1999 (Figure 3). Yet, the bankruptcy of a number 
of banks accentuated the credit crunch, which could not be mitigated by any foreign liqu-
idity buffer. While this resulted in a recession, the use of foreign assets (both CNB and 
private bank assets) helped offset a potentially larger fall in economic activity.
Euro deposits8 and short-term external debt9 provide the background for a double 
drain risk in Croatia. The volatility in these two variables during a crisis could lead to a 
large foreign liquidity requirement (as they did during the 1998/1999 crisis). Hence, fore-
ign reserves serve the twofold role of stabilizing both output and domestic absorption in 
a dollarized economy faced with a double drain risk. Nowadays, as in the 1998/1999 epi-
sode, euro deposits still represent the main vulnerability for the Croatian economy (Figu-
re 4 shows that an internal drain risk might persistently be significant given that on ave-
rage the foreign reserves covered only half of the euro deposits during the observed pe-
riod). On the other hand, short-term external debt does not seem to imply a persistently 
8 Euro deposits include euro deposits of households and non-residents of all maturities. 
9 We treat installments on long term debt that are due in period (year) t as short-term debt issued in the previo-
us year. It will not be possible to roll over this principal repayment if a sudden stop shock hits the economy. We have 
been unable to present data on short term debt during the sudden stop with a banking crisis since data on short-term 







1998/Q1   1998/Q2   1998/Q3   1998/Q4   1999/Q1   1999/Q2   1999/Q3   1999/Q4
 financial account    absorption (growth rate)
 real GDP (growth rate)   CNB foreign reserves
Figure 1 Components of domestic absorption (series are standardized)
Source: HNB
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98/Q1   98/Q2   98/Q3   98/Q4    99/Q1   99/Q2    99/Q3   99/Q4   00/Q1   00/Q2    00/Q3
 banks' foreign liquid assets   nonresidents' euro deposits
  residents' kuna deposits   residents' euro deposits  








 residents' euro deposits withdrawal   nonresidents' euro deposits 
withdrawal   banks' foreign liquid asset drop   CNB foreign reserves drop
Figure 3  Euro deposits withdrawal and foreign buffers drop (mil. EUR) during the 
sudden stop with banking crisis
Source: CNB
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high external drain risk since on average the foreign reserves covered a little over 100% 
of the short-term external debt during the same period.
Figure 4  Short term foreign currency debt and euro deposits in % of foreign reserves 
in the period 1998-2007
Source: CNB
In practice foreign reserve adequacy has often been assessed using simple rules of 
thumb, such as maintaining reserves equivalent to three months of imports, or the Green-
span-Guidotti rule of full coverage of short-term external debt10. According to Šonje (2007) 
Croatia is on safe grounds as far as the second indicator of adequacy of foreign reserves 
is concerned. Even if one considers a situation of an extreme shock hitting our economy, 
Šonje shows, foreign reserves are twice as high as our short-term external debt. Althou-
gh we use a broader definition of short-term external debt (Figure 5 shows the behavior 
of the two standard indicators), Šonje’s result still holds (even though short-term exter-
nal debt is almost equal to foreign reserves in recent years). Moreover, Croatia’s (gross) 
foreign reserves cover more than 100%11 of its short term external debt and more than 5 
months of its imports. Thus, one might conclude that Croatia’s foreign reserves are adequ-
ate. However, these two indicators do not take into account a high degree of deposit do-
llarization which represents a main vulnerability for the Croatian economy (as Figure 4 
shows), raising doubts about their appropriateness.
10 These two indicators are used given that empirical research show that they appear to be a potent predictors of 
currency crises and sudden stops.
11 Notice that we are using an extended definition of short-term external debt that is usually not used in the lite-
rature that discusses the foreign reserves adequacy. Therefore the reader should be careful in interpreting the threshold 








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 public-sector short-term external debt  
 private-sector short-term external debt  
 euro deposits
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Figure 5  Reserves to short-term external debt ratio (%) and Reserves in months of 
imports
Source: authors’ calculation, CNB
Moreover, use of these indicators is not useful in general in assessing whether actual 
reserves are too high or too low, because they are not based on any optimality criterion. 
The national accounting equation (1) shows that by releasing foreign reserves it is 
possible to increase domestic absorption. Hence, holding foreign reserves comes at a cost 
– reserves could be used to repay foreign loans or to invest in assets with higher returns. 
As much as we are interested in answering the question of whether central banks have 
enough foreign reserves to mitigate the negative effects of a possible sudden stop combi-
ned with a banking crisis we also have to examine whether we have too much of a good 
thing. Standard indicators can not help in tackling this issue – they neither consider the 
opportunity costs of holding reserves nor take into account the expected precautionary 
benefit of holding reserves.
In a previous article Šonje (2005) had conjectured correctly that the two standard in-
dicators of reserve adequacy might no longer be valid in the new financial environment. 
He called for a new formula for optimal reserves, arguing against regulation that limits 
foreign-related risks by maintaining banks' foreign liquid assets, as an additional buffer, 
at a level that keeps crisis indicators12 below certain thresholds. However, although he ri-
ghtly calls for the missing optimality criterion in determining the desirable level of pri-
vate foreign liquidity, Šonje’s argument is based on historical thresholds that are by no 
means founded on an optimality norm. 






1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 reservs to short-term debt (left)   Greenspan-Guidotti rule (left)
 reserves in months of imports (right)   3-month imports
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By contast, our model offers a formula of optimal reserves that is based on a micro-
founded rule of maximizing the welfare of the economy. This norm balances between 
costs and benefits of holding foreign reserves and thus offers an appropriate benchmark 
for assessing the foreign reserves adequacy. Using optimal reserves in the cost-benefit 
analysis of regulation related to foreign risks might be therefore more appropriate than 
employing crisis indicators and their arbitrary thresholds.
3 The model
We construct a simple, discrete time model of self-insurance offered by foreign reser-
ves. Our model follows the structure of the model in Goncalves (2007) and Ranciere and 
Jeanne (2006). Foreign reserves help mitigate negative domestic consumption effects of 
a sudden stop that comes in tandem with a bank run in a dollarized economy. Our model 
is simple in two aspects. First, we do not differentiate between household and corporate 
behavior. Second, instead of modeling some elements explicitly, we make many assump-
tions about actions of the agents during a sudden stop period based on stylized facts of a 
sudden stop combined with banking crisis events.
The only uncertainty in the model comes from the probability of a sudden stop. There 
are three sectors in our model economy: households (which also incorporate corporate be-
havior), banks, and the government, which also plays the role of the central bank.
A sudden stop is characterized by the following assumptions. Once the economy is 
hit by a sudden stop:
• no short-term foreign loans are rolled over in any sector,
• real GDP falls by some fraction,
• kuna/euro exchange rate depreciates,
•  some kuna deposits (both household and corporate) are exchanged for euro depo-
sits,
•  a bank run occurs – a fraction of the overall deposits of the non-financial sector is 
withdrawn from banks,
•  the central bank (government) lowers kuna and euro reserve requirements by a frac-
tion of αk and α f respectively,
• government stops repaying long-term liabilities that become due,
•  banks and households withdraw their foreign liquid assets from abroad to use them 
as a buffer against a sudden stop. 
Except for the richer structure of our model there are couple of important differences 
between it and the model in Goncalves (2007). These differences stem from differences 
between the Croatian and Uruguayan economy. A bank run in our model occurs as a re-
sult of a loss of household confidence (in comparison to nonresident deposit withdrawal 
in Goncalves (2007)). Some of the deposits pulled out of the banking system are used as 
a buffer against lost access to the foreign loans market. Furthermore, during the bank run, 
households exchange some of their kuna deposits for euro deposits because of the loss 
of confidence in the domestic currency. This feature is not present in Goncalves (2007). 
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Finally, removing dynamics in the formula for optimal reserves (as in Goncalves, 2007) 
might lead to a problematic interpretation of reserves optimality (at least ex-ante). There-
fore, our formula preserves the dynamics.
In the next several sections, we first present our model, then we calibrate the model 
and derive the formula for optimal reserves, and finally, we show and interpret our re-
sults and their robustness.
3.1 Non-financial sector – households
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households of measure one. All households 
have identical preferences with respect to consumption ct of the single good. Preferences 
are represented by the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function that has a 
constant relative risk aversion form.
The price of consumption good is Pt. This good is financed by a deterministic exoge-
nous endowment yt, which grows over time at the rate of g. In addition to this endowment, 
the sources of households' funds include: domestic loans, foreign loans, transfer from the 
government, profits of the financial sector, deposits and foreign liquid assets that become 
due. All loans and deposits of households are assumed to be short-term. Households can 
borrow from domestic banks or from abroad. If they go for a loan to domestic banks they 
can choose between euro denominated (or indexed to kuna/euro exchange rate, St), ltf, or 
kuna denominated loan, ltk . Loans from abroad, bt, are only in euros. In the event of a sud-
den stop, which comes with probability π, households cannot roll over this foreign loan. A 
transfer from the government, Tt, is distributed in a lump sum manner. Since households 
are assumed to be owners of the financial sector they receive all their profits, Πt (if any). 
For simplicity, we assume that all interest rates, r, are the same and constant.13
From the overall sources of funds households buy goods, repay their domestic and fo-
reign loans at given interest rates and decide about the structure of funds they will invest 
as domestic versus foreign bank deposit. They can choose between foreign denominated, 
dtf , and kuna denominated deposits, dtk, that are due next period. Moreover, there are also 
two types of deposits14: household deposits, dtkh  and dtfh, and corporate deposits, dtkc and 
dtfc. Foreign bank deposits (foreign liquid assets) are denoted by FRBth.
The timing of the actions within the period when the sudden stop occurs is as follows. 
At the beginning of the period households invest their funds in kuna and euro deposits. 
Then a sudden stop occurs. The kuna depreciates (against the euro) by an absolute change 
of ∆S. Access of households to the foreign loans market is canceled. Households convert 
a fraction, η, of kuna deposits into euro deposits. At the end of the period households wit-
hdraw a fraction of overall deposits, φ, (which also include the newly converted deposits, 
from kuna to euro). A fraction of euro household deposits withdrawn will not be used as 
a substitute for foreign loans that are no longer available. On the other hand, kuna house-
hold deposits together with kuna and euro corporate deposits will act as a buffer against 
sudden stop effects. In other words, only euro household deposits withdrawn from the 
banking system will not be used as a buffer against sudden stop effects. In our model wi-
13 Differentiating between interest rates on deposits and loans would not change our formula of optimal reserves.
14 This assumption circumvents modeling households and firms behavior separately.
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thdrawing euro deposits does not have any impact on the budget constraint of househol-
ds during a sudden stop – households cannot use these funds to buy goods (since these 
funds are in euros) and they do not yield any interest rate (since these funds are outside 
financial sector). This is why they do not appear in the budget constraint – in the model, 
putting euro deposits under the mattress is equal to putting money into a term deposit that 
does not fall due during the period of a sudden stop.
Tables 1 and 2 present the balance sheets of households in the period before the sud-
den stop and in the period when the sudden stop occurs. These tables summarize actions 
of households during those two periods.
To make optimal decisions on how much to consume, how much to save and how 
much to borrow, households maximize the expected discounted value of utility i.e. solve 
the following problem: 
,
subject to budget constraints
• before a sudden stop:
Ptct + St (1 + r)l 
f
t-1
 + (1 + r) l kt-1 + St (1 + r)bt-1 + St (dtfh + dtfc) + (dtkh + dtkc) +
St FRBth = Pt yt + St ltf + ltk + Stbt + St (1 + r) ( ) + (1 + r)( ) +
St (1 + r) FRBht-1 + Πt + Tt (2)
• during a sudden stop: 
Ptct + (St + ∆S) (1 + r) l 
f
t-1
 + (1 + r) l kt-1 + (St + ∆S) (1 + r)bt-1 +
(St + ∆S) (dtfh + dtfc) + (dtkh + dtkc) =
(1 – γ)Ptyt + (St + ∆S) ltf + ltk + (St + ∆S) (1 + r) ( ) +
+
(St + ∆S) (1 + r) FRBht-1 + Πt + Tt (3)
where  with σ the relative risk aversion parameter and γ the output cost of 
a sudden stop with a banking crisis.
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3.2 Financial sector – banks
We consider a simple version of the banking sector where the only role of banks is 
to take deposits from households, take out loans from abroad and extend loans to house-
holds. We are assuming perfect competition in the banking sector so that the whole sec-
tor can be represented by a representative bank. The bank's assets consist of kuna cre-
dit, ltk, euro credit, ltf, reserve requirement that the monetary authority imposes on bank's 
sources of funds, RBt, and private banks' foreign liquid assets, FRBtb. The reserve requ-
irement is imposed on both domestic and foreign sources of finance (RBtk, RBtf respecti-
vely). However, half of the reserve requirement imposed on foreign liabilities is paid in 
kuna. The monetary authority pays no interest on these reserves. The source of finance 
consists of kuna deposits, dtk (as a sum of household and corporate kuna deposits), euro 
deposits, dtf (as a sum of household and corporate euro deposits), and short-term foreign 
borrowings, FBt. 
The bank earns profits by extending kuna and euro denominated loans after they be-
come due. The amount of deposits that the bank has to return to households represents 
its costs (augmented by the nominal deposit interest rate). Furthermore, if the bank takes 
the loan from abroad (FBt > 0) it will have to return it in the next period with the cost of 
exogenous nominal interest rate, r.
Table 1 Balance sheet of households before the sudden stop
Assets Liabilities 
kuna deposits, dtk (= dtkh + dtkc) short-term kuna loans, ltk
euro deposits, St dtf = St (dtfh + dtfc) short-term euro loans, St ltf
foreign liquid assets, St FRBth short-term foreign borrowing, St bt
profits, Πt  
transfer from the government, Tt  
Table 2 Balance sheet of households in the period when the sudden stop occurs
Assets Liabilities 
kuna household deposits, dtkh – φ (1 – η)dtkh short-term kuna loans, ltk 
euro household deposits, (St + ∆S) dtfh short-term euro loans, (St + ∆S) ltf




foreign liquid assets, St FRBth = 0  
profits, Πt  
transfer from the government, Tt  
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Tables 3 and 4 present the balance sheet of the banking sector before and during sud-
den stop. During the sudden stop banks’ access to foreign loans market is stopped. Furt-
hermore, a bank run on deposits occurs. To mitigate the effects on loans, banks liquidate 
their foreign assets and use them to cover a part of deposit claims. Notice that euro hou-
sehold deposits that are withdrawn from banking system and put under the mattress are 
visible here in the balance sheet of the banking sector.
Table 4 Balance sheet of banking sector during the sudden stop
Assets Liabilities 
short-term kuna loans, ltk
kuna household deposits, 
dtkh – φ (1 – η)dtkh
short-term euro loans, (St + ∆S) ltf
euro household deposits,
reserve requirement, RBtk + (St + ∆S) RBtf kuna corporate deposits, dtkc – φ (1 – η) dtkc
foreign liquid assets, (St + ∆S) FRBtb = 0
euro corporate deposits,
short-term foreign borrowing, (St + ∆S) FBt = 0
Table 3 Balance sheet of banking sector before the sudden stop
Assets Liabilities 
short-term kuna loans, ltk kuna deposits, dtk (= dtkh + dtkc)
short-term euro loans, St ltf euro deposits, St dtf = St (dtfh + dtfc)
reserve requirement, RBtk + St RBtf short-term foreign borrowing, St FBt
foreign liquid assets, St FRBtb
The representative bank is choosing domestic deposit demand, domestic loan supply 
and international net borrowings optimally i.e. so as to maximize its profit (which is re-
turned to households) taking interest rates and the exchange rate as given:
,
subject to:
• profits before a sudden stop
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where  is bank's stochastic discount factor (the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of consumption in the time period t for consumption in the time period 0 of the bank's 
owner). Reserve requirement ratio on domestic and foreign liabilities are denoted by ωk 
and ωf, respectively. Parameters αk and αf represent central bank relief in terms of relea-
sing part of reserve requirement to mitigate a bank run.
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3.3 Government – central bank
The role of the government is simple. Government expenditures consist of internatio-
nal reserves, Rt, transfers to households15, Tt, repayment of short-term foreign debt, FGt-1,
reserve requirement that is due, RBt-1 (as a sum of reserve requirement on kuna liabiliti-
es, RBt
k
-1, and foreign reserve requirement, RBt
f
-1), and a long-term debt matured at time t, 
P Nt-1. The government is assumed to be the only sector that can issue long-term security 
to finance a stock of international reserves
Rt = PNt.
By selling this security, the government pays term premium, δ, which captures the 
cost of issuing long-term debt instead of short-term debt. This long-term external debt 
(long-term security) yields one unit of good in every period until a sudden stop occurs. 
Hence, in period t the government has to pay one unit of a good for every unit bond issu-
ed (Nt denotes a stock of bonds issued by the time period t). For simplicity, the price of 
long-term debt, P is not explicitly modeled16. We assume that before a sudden stop the 
price of long-term security is constant and falls to zero when a sudden stop hits the eco-
nomy. Hence, before the sudden stop the price of long-term security is equal to the expec-
ted present discounted value of its payoffs next period (equal to 1) and the expected price 





where r + δ is the interest rate on the long-term security.
The government expenditures are financed by short-term foreign credits, FGt, long-
term borrowing , PNt, reserve requirement, RBt and the international reserves that are 
due in period t. During a sudden stop, government cannot issue short-debt. It also relea-
ses part of the reserve requirement (by a fraction of αk and αf). Balance sheets of the go-
vernment before and during a sudden stop, summarizing the actions of government, are 
given in Tables 5 and 6.
15 The government returns to households any seigniorage revenues in form of a lump sum transfer.
16 Modeling a price of a bond would require modeling behavior of agents selling bonds i.e. modeling behavior of 
foreigners. Nevertheless, the price of any bond comes down to a simple formula (e.g. from the Lucas tree model).
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Overall, before a sudden stop the government budget constraint is given by:
 (12)
where RBtk and RBtf are given as in (5) and (6) respectively.
During a sudden stop the government budget constraint reads as follows:
 (13)
where RBtk and RBtf are given as in (8) and (9) respectively.
Table 5 Balance sheet of the government before a sudden stop
Assets Liabilities 
international reserves, St Rt short-term foreign borrowing, St FGt
long-term foreign borrowing, St PNt – St PNt-1
reserve requirement, RBtk + St RBtf
 transfer from the government, Tt
Table 6 Balance sheet of the government during a sudden stop
Assets Liabilities 
international reserves, (St + ∆S) Rt short-term foreign borrowing, (St + ∆S) FGt = 0
long-term foreign borrowing, (St + ∆S) PNt
reserve requirement, RBtk + (St + ∆S) RBtf
transfer from the government, Tt
3.4 Equilibrium and the Ramsey problem
A competitive equilibrium is an allocation  ,
, prices  and a government po-
licy  such that
•  given prices and government policy, the allocation solves both household and bank 
problems
•  given allocation and prices, government policy satisfies the government budget 
constraint. 
There are many competitive equilibria since there are many government policies sa-
tisfying the government budget constraint. Hence the government is in a position to cho-
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ose the best equilibrium by its choice of policy. In the Ramsey problem the government 
chooses a competitive equilibrium that maximizes household welfare (given by he hou-
sehold utility function). 
In our case, the government will choose a competitive equilibrium indexed by inter-
national reserves that maximizes the welfare of households. In other words, the gover-
nment imposes its policy to make households as happy as possible taking into account the 
overall (consolidated) budget constraint17 of the economy:
,
subject to consolidated budget constraint:
• before a sudden stop
 (14)
• during a sudden stop
 
(15)
In the Appendix we show that the consolidated budget constraint actually correspon-
ds to the national accounts identity (1). Hence, the budget constraint of the economy re-
presents all maximum possible combinations of consumption which are consistent with 
national accounts. The welfare maximization principle determines which consumption 
point the government will actually choose.
Furthermore, the consolidated budget constraint shows that holding reserves is equ-
ivalent to repaying short-term external debt by issuing more expensive long-term debt. 
Even though this is costly, there is a benefit stemming from the possibility of replacing 
short-term by long-term debt during the sudden stop.
17 Derivation of consolidated budget constraint is provided in Appendix.
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It is clear that holding foreign reserves is beneficial. Foreign reserves allow consump-
tion smoothing of the non-financial sector by changing transfers to this sector. Counter-
balancing these precautionary motives for holding reserves are their opportunity costs 
which in practice arise from substituting high yielding domestic assets for lower yielding 
foreign ones. We do not proxy these costs as the difference between the domestic mar-
ginal product of capital and the returns obtained on the reserve assets. Instead, we model 
these costs as in Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) – foreign reserves have opportunity costs 
since they are financed by issuing long-term debt at a term premium. In other words, the 
opportunity cost of reserves is defined as the difference between the interest rate paid on 
the country's liabilities (r + δ) and the lower return received on the reserves (r). 
3.5 Optimal reserves
Since we are interested in the optimal path of international reserves we present the op-
timality condition of the government's problem, which pertains to international reserves, 
Rt., only. Choosing international reserves affects consumption in the next period. There-
fore, we can simplify government's problem when choosing international reserves as
,
subject to consolidated budget constraint (14) and (15). Substituting for consumption be-
fore a sudden stop, cbt+1, and consumption during a sudden stop, cdt+1, from consolidated 
budget constraint before and during a sudden stop and deciding about the level of reser-
ves that maximizes the welfare of the economy, the first order condition with respect to 
Rt is given as
 
(16)
This optimality condition balances benefits and costs of holding reserves – expected 
marginal benefit of holding reserves during the crisis (right-hand side) has to be equal to 
expected marginal cost of holding reserves before the sudden stop (left hand side).
From (16) we have a level of optimal reserves that reads as follows18
 
(17)
18 Derivation of the optimal reserves formula is provided in Appendix.
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with 
.
A formula for optimal reserves provides the level of reserves that a central bank needs 
to hold today if it wants to prevent the expected negative effects of a sudden stop with ban-
king crisis that might happen tomorrow. At the same time, by holding optimal reserves, a 
central bank is smoothing consumption, which yields maximum possible welfare. Opti-
mal reserves increase with overall expected short-term external debt, λ*t+1, possible forei-
gn deposit withdrawal, φλDt+1, output loss, γ, probability of a sudden stop, π and exchange 
rate depreciation, ∆S. The first two variables pertain to a double drain risk. The central 
bank is holding reserves so as to step in if an external drain risk is realized (short-term 
external debt falls to zero) or if an internal drain risk materialises (if a bank run occurs). 
Output loss, exchange rate depreciation and probability of a sudden stop are parameters 
in our model that have to be calibrated. Output loss affects the optimal level of reserves 
in that it reduces domestic absorption. Exchange rate depreciation increases the burden 
of potential foreign liabilities and forces the central bank to hold more reserves. The first 
two variables pertain to a double drain risk. The central bank is holding reserves so as to 
step in if an external drain risk is realized (short-term external debt falls to zero) or if an 
internal drain risk materialises (if a bank run occurs). Output loss, exchange rate depre-
ciation and probability of a sudden stop are parameters in our model that have to be cali-
brated. Output loss affects the optimal level of reserves in that it reduces domestic absor-
ption. Exchange rate depreciation increases the burden of potential foreign liabilities and 
forces the central bank to hold more reserves, δ, increase and if the alternative buffer in 
terms of expected foreign liquid assets of private sector, λAt+1 increases.
Our formula for optimal reserves differs from that in Goncalves (2007) in that it pre-
serves dynamics19. Excluding dynamics from the formula comes at the cost of losing one 
of the main implications of the model – the model implies that central bank needs to be 
ready for a crisis – to prevent the crisis, a central bank needs to hold optimal reserves in 
the period before the crisis, as a precautionary measure.
Ruling out dynamics does not pose a big problem in ex-post interpretation of opti-
mal reserves. To see why, imagine, for example, that one is interpreting a crisis that hap-
19 Goncalves (2007) makes all model variables in period t+1 equal to the value of the corresponding model vari-
able in period t .
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pened in 2002 (as it did in Uruguay) from todays' perspective. A dynamic formula (like 
ours) would result in lower optimal reserves in comparison to optimal reserves implied 
by a static formula (like that in Goncalves (2007)). The reason for this is that when cal-
culating optimal reserves ex-post, one is using the past (realized) data and not the expec-
ted data. Hence when the crisis is realized the values of the variables that are hit during 
the crisis fall (for example, short-term external debt falls since it is not rolled over and 
foreign deposits fall because of the bank run). Hence, optimal reserves in 2001 would be 
lower than those one would calculate using a static formula (which would not use 2002 
data). Therefore, a dynamic formula would underestimate optimal reserves before the cri-
sis. However, a static formula would overestimate optimal reserves during the crisis pe-
riod since it does not take into account the recovery period that comes after the crisis and 
that implies the holding of fewer reserves20.
Moreover, a static formula might lead to a problematic interpretation of optimal re-
serves ex-ante. A static formula is not a forward-looking formula. On the other hand, a 
dynamic formula implies a level of reserves today such as to prevent a crisis tomorrow. 
A forward looking analysis of current reserves using a static formula does not have anyt-
hing to say about this issue.
Regarding the comparison of standard indicators of reserves adequacy and optimal 
reserves, notice that we can restrict a formula of optimal reserves tomake it equal to the 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule:
Rt = λ*t+1 (18)
This would hold if there were no alternative buffer to protect the economy from a cri-
sis, no output costs of the crisis, no effects from the bank run, and no depreciation during 
the crisis. Even though many analysts use this indicator in assessing adequacy of reser-
ves, it is clear that the restricted formula does not even reflect the stylized facts of sudden 
stops combined with banking crises since it excludes the main elements of all episodes of 
a sudden stop combined with abanking crisis.
3.6 Calibration
To go from the general formula for optimal reserves to quantitative statements about 
the issues of holding the optimal amount of international reserves we have to calibrate the 
model. In other words, the model's ability to say something about optimal reserves depen-
ds on the model's parameters. Calibrating the model involves finding numerical values for 
parameters using the model as the basis for restricting the model economy and mapping 
that economy onto the data. Hence, in calibrating the model we assign numerical valu-
es to all the model's parameters, which characterize preferences and technology, so as to 
make it roughly consistent with some of the empirical regularities that reflect the structu-
re of the Croatian economy. If the parameter value cannot be pinned down from the data, 
20 On average, the static formula in Goncalves (2007) yields different results than the dynamic formula in the 
amount of 4% of GDP whereas the biggest difference comes in the crisis period. The comparisons of the results of 
static and dynamic formula in Goncalves (2007) are available upon request.
441
A. M. Čeh and I. Krznar: Optimal Foreign Reserves: Tha Case of Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (4) 421-460 (2008)
we will adapt its value from the existing studies and run a sensitivity analysis to see how 
optimal reserves change if we change a specific parameter.
We managed to calibrate most of the parameter values based on the sudden stop with 
a banking crisis episode during 1998/1999. In other words, benchmark calibration invol-
ves setting parameter values to reflect the 1998/1999 sudden stop with banking crisis epi-
sode. Even though we use end-of-period annual data when calculating the optimal reser-
ves (in the next section), in calibrating the model we use quarterly and monthly data so 
as to determine the date of the crisis and its consequences more precisely. This is becau-
se the sudden stop happened somewhere in the middle of a year (third quarter of 1998). 
Furthermore, by the end of the next year the most severe effects of that sudden stop com-
bined with banking crisis had disappeared as external credit lines reopened again and the 
banking crisis culminated somewhere in the middle of 1999. Hence, by using annual data 
we would probably underestimate the consequences of this sudden stop combined with 
banking crisis.
There is no official date when the 1998/1999 sudden stop combined with a banking 
crisis started. It should be the date when issuing new external debt was no longer possible 
and when a bank run occurred. Hence, we should be able to discern the beginning of the 
sudden stop with a banking crisis in the data for external debt and banking activity. Un-
fortunately, data on external debt are available from December 1998 only. However, we 
do have longer time series on non-residential deposits, which also count as external debt. 
Moreover, we have longer time series of financial accounts that reflects the behavior of 
external debt. We take the peak and the trough of non-residential deposits as the start and 
the end of the sudden stop combined with a banking crisis period, respectively. Therefo-
re, the sudden stop with banking crisis began in March 1998 (that correspond to the date 
of Dubrovačka banka failure) and its consequences were still felt until end-May 1999. 
These dates approximately correspond to the banking and real sector slowdown (and re-
covery) and financial account reversal discussed in Section 2.
We set the parameter value for exchange rate depreciation rate, ∆S, to match the exc-
hange rate increase during the sudden stop combined with a banking crisis period when 
it went up by 8%.
The growth rate of GDP, g, was calibrated as the average annual growth rate of po-
tential real GDP over the period 1998 – 2007 which is equal to 3.9%. Potential GDP was 
estimated using the Hoddrick-Prescott filter. Output loss during the sudden stop with a 
banking crisis, γ, was calibrated as the difference between the average growth rate of po-
tential GDP and the largest (negative) actual GDP growth rate during the sudden stop with 
a banking crisis period (which happened just after the sudden stop with a banking crisis 
had started – in the fourth quarter of 1998 when real GDP changed by -4,8%). Hence, 
the output loss during the sudden stop with banking crisis period is set to 8,7% of nomi-
nal GDP.
To account for a possible Tequila effect we define a parameter that characterizes a 
fraction of kuna deposits exchanged for euro deposits, η(αk), to be a function of the kuna 
reserve requirement relief during a sudden stop
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η(αk) = s0 + sααk,
where s0 is the parameter of the kuna deposit that would be exchanged for euros in any 
event (even if the central bank did not respond to a sudden stop) and sα measures the ela-
sticity of deposit withdrawal to a central bank move to decrease the reserve requirement (" 
Tequila effect" ). During the sudden stop with a bank run episode in Mexico, the Central 
Bank of Mexico tried to fight the credit crunch by lowering the reserve requirement. This 
reaction by the central bank seemed to be a positive move towards stopping the bank run. 
However, it induced people to exchange even more pesos for dollars when they realized 
they had a chance to exchange the full amount of their peso savings, and put an even hi-
gher burden on the banking system. Since the Croatian National Bank did not react to the 
sudden stop with a banking crisis by lowering the reserve requirement in 1998/1999 we 
set sα = 0 in the benchmark case. This parameter will be relevant in the alternative cali-
bration where we study what amount of optimal international reserve should be held as a 
precautionary insurance against possible future "Tequila effects". Parameter s0 was cali-
brated according to the fact that 19% of kuna deposits were withdrawn from the banking 
system (starting in August 1998 and ending just one month after the euro deposit with-
drawal happened). We assume that those kuna deposits were exchanged for euros21. No-
tice that releasing the reserve requirement on banks' foreign liabilities does not have any 
effect on optimal reserves since we work with gross foreign reserves (partially financed 
by reserve requirement).
The parameter value that characterizes the deposit withdrawal rate during a sudden 
stop with a banking crisis period, φ, is set to the value that matches the drop of euro de-
posits22 during the 1998/1999 episode. Data show that the peak level of euro deposits was 
recorded in February 1999, followed by a 17% drop in the period of three months.
Parameter values that describe reserve requirement ratios on kuna and euro deno-
ted liabilities, ωk and ωf, respectively, were set to their actual values at the end of 2007. 
Parameter ωk was set to the ratio of kuna reserve requirement and bank's domestic lia-
bilities (deposit money, kuna deposits, government deposits, CNB credits) in December 
2007 that is equal to 17%. Parameter ωf was set to the ratio of the euro reserve require-
ment and the banks' foreign liabilities (euro deposits, euro liabilities and the difference 
between foreign assets and banks' international reserves to account for the numerator of 
the CNB prescribed minimum foreign currency liquidity ratio for banks) equal to 17% 
in December 2007.
Since we experienced only one sudden stop in the last ten years, we cannot use stan-
dard probit estimation techniques to estimate the probability of a sudden stop. In the bench-
mark calibration we set the probability of crisis that implies on average one crisis in every 
ten years (π = 0.1). This value corresponds to the probit estimation of a sudden stop pro-
bability on panel data for 34 middle income countries in Ranciere and Jeanne (2006).
21 This might be a reason why euro deposits did not decline before February 1999 and were actually rising.
22 In calibration of φ we were not considering kuna deposits since euro deposits account for the largest part of 
overall deposits.
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We adapt the standard value for the risk aversion parameter, σ, from the real busine-
ss cycle literature (equal to = 2).
The term premium, δ, was calculated as an average difference between the yield on 
10-year German government bond and ECB main refinancing repo rate (δ = 1.3 percen-
tage points).
We assume that the interest rate in the model, r, is the return on reserves (among other 
things) and is equal to an average foreign risk-free rate, in the Croatian case set at the six 
month Euribor rate (3.3%).
Table 7 summarizes the values of the calibrated parameters.
Table 7 Benchmark calibration
Symbol Parameter Benchmark 
(98/99) Value
π probability of sudden stop (%) 10.0
g growth rate of potential GDP (%)   3.9
r interest rate (%)   3.3
δ term premium (pp)   1.3
σ relative risk aversion   2.0
ωk kuna reserve requirement ratio (%) 17.0
ωf euro reserve requirement ratio (%) 17.0
αk kuna reserve requirement relief during sudden stop (pp)   0.0
γ output loss during sudden stop (%)   8.7
∆S exchange rate depreciation rate (%)   8.0
φ fraction of deposit withdrawn (%) 17.0
s0 fraction of kuna deposits exchanged for euro deposits (constant) (%) 19.0
sα fraction of kuna deposits exchanged for euro deposits (elasticity)   0.0
3.7 Data
In addition to the parameter values, we need the data to plug into our formula of op-
timal reserves in order to explore the quantitative implications of the model. There are a 
couple of things worth mentioning regarding data. First, we augment the short-term exter-
nal debt of every sector by the principal payments of its long-term debt that are due. These 
principal payments represent a short-term liability and do not depend on the occurrence 
of a sudden stop. Second, most deposits, even deposits with long maturities, can be ea-
sily withdrawn at any point in time. Therefore, we treat non-residents’ deposits (mainly 
deposits of parent banks) of all maturities as short-term external debt of the banking sec-
tor. Foreign liquid assets of the non-banking sector consist of cash and deposits invested 
abroad that can be easily withdrawn. Foreign liquid assets of the banking sector comprise 
mandatory foreign currency reserves that can be used as a buffer against a bank run. Fi-
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nally, since the model implies that reserves are partly financed with the reserve require-
ment we have to use the gross measure of the CNB's foreign reserves.
The presence of foreign banks in the Croatian banking system complicates the story. 
Foreign banks are at the same time owners and largest lenders to the Croatian banking sec-
tor. Therefore, their role in a sudden stop might be different from the role of "ordinary" fo-
reign lenders. During the 1998/1999 episode foreign banks were mostly not present in Cro-
atia. Hence, we do not know how they might behave during a sudden stop, that is, whet-
her they could be expected to act as the lenders of last resort for their Croatian subsidia-
ries by converting their short-term funding into long-term funding or they would simply, 
”take the money and run". Current literature on parent bank behavior provides evidence 
that parent banks’ presence adds significantly to the stability of the financial sector as the 
parent banks tend to provide liquidity and capital support during banking crises. Gardo 
2008 conjectures that parent banks might sustain business activities in Central and Eastern 
Europe to benefit from the opportunities arising from the region's catching-up potential in 
terms of the scale and scope of banking activities. Hence parent banks might protect their 
subsidiaries in the event of the crisis. Using panel data on the intra-group ownership struc-
ture and the balance sheets of 45 of the largest banking groups in the world, Haas (2006) 
finds that parent banks tend to support weak subsidiaries by providing additional capital 
when the latter are confronted with adverse financial conditions. Using annual financial 
statements of individual banks operating in 11 countries in East Asia and Latin America 
Brei 2007 finds that foreign banks significantly attenuate the adverse effects of sudden 
stops on domestic lending volume, playing an important stabilizing role. 
Moreover, in the case of the unexpected loss of Riječka banka in 2002, which provo-
ked a run on its deposits, the parent bank (Bayerische Landesbank) ran as soon as it heard 
the bad news (by selling Riječka banka to the government for 1 euro). However, it did not 
claim its money back in terms of deposit withdrawal or cancellation of credit lines proba-
bly because the cost of loss of reputation would have been too large. To account for two 
possibilities of parent bank behavior we use two definitions of banks' foreign borrowing. 
When we treat parent banks as lenders of last resort their euro deposits and their short-term 
loans are excluded from the above definition of augmented short-term external debt.
3.8 Findings
Plugging the data into the formula for optimal reserves, our benchmark calibration 
implies that the level of optimal reserves depends mainly on the reaction of parent banks 
during a potential sudden stop combined with a banking crisis (Figure 6).
If we assume that during the crisis all parent banks play their lender of last resort 
roles, then the level of the actual reserves was on average three times the optimal level in 
the period 1998-2007. The large difference between the actual and the optimal levels of 
the foreign reserves is a consequence of the low calculated level of the optimal reserves 
(even negative in 2000) and the strong accumulation of the actual reserves until 2003. 
After 2003, the difference between the actual and the optimal reserve levels falls mainly 
as a consequence of a big increase in the calculated level of the optimal reserves. At the 
end of 2007, the foreign reserves of the CNB were almost twice as big as the optimal re-
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Figure 6  Benchmark calibration – actual reserves, optimal reserves where parent 
banks act as the lenders of last resort, optimal reserves where parent banks 
participate in a crisis (bill. EUR)
Source: authors’ calculation; CNB
serves. However, the picture is quite different if we assume that parent banks will turn 
their back on Croatian banks in the event of a sudden stop combined with a banking crisis. 
Under this assumption, the need for foreign reserves has increased since 2003 from well 
below to near the actual level at the end of 2007 as domestic lending was fueled by fore-
ign borrowing from parent banks (mostly in the form of foreign deposits). Still, if during 
2008 Croatia experiences a sudden stop with banking crisis of the 1998/1999 magnitude, 
then regardless of the parent banks' reaction, the CNB has just enough reserves to prevent 
a financial account reversal and a bank run causing consumption loss.
Figures 7 and 8 explain the pattern of the optimal reserves. We decompose the opti-
mal reserves into their four main components of optimal reserves formula (17). Optimal 
reserves are defined as the weighted difference between contributions of output loss, the 
short-term external debt change, and the deposit withdrawal on one hand, and the contri-
bution of the change in the foreign liquid assets of firms and banks on the other23.
The negative calculated optimal reserve level for 2000 is primarily a consequence of 
the high growth of foreign liquid assets of the private sector during 2001, due to the Ger-
man mark-to-euro conversion at the end of 2001. The model suggests that at the end of 
2000 the CNB did not have to hold any reserves since the private sector's buffers were 
23 Note that these components do not perfectly correspond to the data since they are given weights that come from 
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Figure 7  Decomposition of optimal reserves (billion euros) where parent banks act as 
the lenders of last resort
Source: authors’ calculation
large enough to cope with a possible sudden stop with banking crisis during 200124. The 
high growth of the calculated optimal reserve level by 2004 is largely the end result of high 
borrowing of banks and firms from abroad in the interim period. These trends in the cal-
culated level of the optimal reserves are observed for both scenarios of the parent banks' 
behavior. The large difference between the optimal reserve levels calculated in the two 
cases indicates that the major part of the external borrowing pertains to parent-subsidi-
ary bank credit/deposit lines. The optimal reserves slowdown at the end of 2007 can for 
the most part be explained by a smaller increase in banks' foreign debt due to the CNB's 
credit growth ceiling.
Next, we study if it is wise to release a part of the banks' reserves (by lowering 
the reserve requirement) to help the banking sector cope with the deposit run assu-
ming that a Tequila effect would emerge. Note that if a Tequila effect does not exist re-
leasing the reserve requirement on foreign liabilities will not have any impact on op-
timal reserves as it willreduce actual reserves and at the same time increase the buf-
fer of banking sector. For the benchmark calibration with Tequila effect (i.e. with 
αk = 17 pp, sα = 1) where the parent banks acting as the lenders of last resort, the central 
bank would fail to help the banking system to overcome the deposit run even if it relea-
sed a part of the kuna reserve requirement. Figure 9 shows how the optimal reserves level 
in 2007 depends on the kuna reserve requirement reduction in this hypothetical scenario 
with the parent banks acting as the lenders of last resort (the perpendicular line indicates 
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Figure 8  Decomposition of optimal reserves (bill. EUR) where parent banks 
participate in a sudden stop
Source: authors’ calculation
the zero benchmark value of kuna reserve requirement relief). The upshot is that due to 
the Tequila effect, the central bank would actually have to hold more (!) reserves to help 
tackle the deposit run. By removing the reserve requirement the central bank would actu-
ally be adding oil to the fire. However, Figure 9 shows that in our model the level of the 
optimal reserves is not sensitive to a change in the reserve requirement. Nevertheless, the 
model suggests that it would not be wise to reduce the reserve requirement when a crisis 
occurs if a Tequila effect appears.
Finally, we investigate how our measure of optimal reserves (for a benchmark cali-
bration and the parent banks acting as the lenders of last resort) corresponds to the rule-
of-thumb measures of reserves adequacy. All three measures of reserves adequacy suggest 
that the CNB had enough reserves as an insurance against a potential crisis during the last 
ten years (Figure 10). However, it is important to notice that the two standard measures 
of reserves adequacy behave differently from our optimal reserves measure. For example, 
in 2000 the optimal reserve level was shown to be negative, but since the two standard 
measures of reserves adequacy do not take into account the private sector's liquid foreign 
assets buffer they suggest that the optimal reserves should have been positive. 
While the optimal reserves level depends on many parameters reflecting common fe-
atures of sudden stops combined with banking crisis, the short-term external debt and the 
3-months-of-imports criteria do not take into account these features. Figures 11 and 12 
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Figure 9 Optimal reserves (bill. EUR) and kuna reserve requirenment relief
Source: authors’ calculation, CNB
are different from the benchmark calibration (perpendicular lines indicates benchmark 
values of the two parameters). 
The error that one would make by using only the two standard measures of reserves 
adequacy in assessing the optimality of those reserves might be quite large. For example, 
if the Croatian economy were hit by a sudden stop with a banking crisis of the 1998/99 ma-
gnitude, then the Greenspan-Guidotti rule implies an "optimal" reserves level more than 2 
billion euros higher than that implied by our measure (the perpendicular line denoting the 
benchmark calibration of the output loss parameter). Actually, for the Greenspan-Guidotti 
rule and our optimal reserves measure to be equal we should be expecting either about 
17.5% (instead of 8.7%) of output loss or about 33% deposit withdrawal (instead of 19%) 
during the hypothetical 2008 crisis. The 3-months-of-import rule does a good job in terms 
of assessing reserves optimality in 2007 in the baseline scenario. However, even though 
the two measures are almost equal from 2004 onward, Figures 11 and 12 show that they 
might yield very different results for the optimal reserves level, depending on the assu-
med output loss and deposit withdrawal parameters. For example, if one expects a crisis 
twice as big as that during 1998/1999 then the Greenspan-Guidotti rule would be closer 
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Figure 10  Actual and optimal reserves with Greenspan-Guidotti and 3-months-of-
imports rules (bill. EUR)
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Figure 11  Optimal reserves, Greenspan-Guidotti rule and 3-months-of-imports rule 
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Source: authors’ calculation, CNB
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Figure 12  Optimal reserves, Greenspan-Guidotti rule and 3-months-of-imports rule 
(billion euros) with different values of fraction of deposit withdrawal (%).
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3.9 Sensitivity analysis
The results discussed in the previous section are conditional on parameter values. In 
this section we check if our results are robust to changes in those parameter values. Table 
8 shows the examined intervals of parameter values and their benchmark calibration. We 
solve for the optimal reserves level for every discrete point in the interval, for each indi-
vidual parameter, and compare this level with the actual reserves level at the end of 2007. 
Furthermore, in Figure 13 we indicate the benchmark value of the corresponding para-
meter (using the perpendicular line). In our sensitivity analysis we assume that the pa-
rent banks act as the lenders of last resort in the event of a sudden stop combined with a 
bank run.25
Figure 13 shows that the optimal level of the reserves depends on the size of the 
eight parameters from Table 8. The optimal level of reserves is particularly sensitive to 
the probability of a sudden stop, exchange rate depreciation, output loss, the term pre-
mium and the fraction of deposit that will be withdrawn during the banking crisis.26 The 
25 We also run sensitivity analysis when parent banks participate in sudden stop (available upon request). Ove-
rall, sensitivity analysis results did not change by much. We do not provide sensitivity analysis for kuna reserve requ-
irement relief during a sudden stop and a fraction of kuna deposits exchanged for euro deposits (elasticity) since in 
the benchmark calibration we assume they are both zero.
26 Note that this is in strike contrast with the Greenspan-Guidotti and 3-months-of imports rules, which do not 
depend on these parameters.
451
A. M. Čeh and I. Krznar: Optimal Foreign Reserves: Tha Case of Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (4) 421-460 (2008)
relation between the probability of a sudden stop and the optimal reserves level is nonli-
near and positive. Hence, the actual probability of a sudden stop is relevant for the opti-
mal reserves level only for small probability values. In the benchmark case, even if one 
doubles the probability (from 10% to 20%) the optimal reserves level would increase by 
only 15%. Increasing the exchange rate depreciation from 8% (in the benchmark case) 
to 20% increases the optimal reserve level by 23%. Doubling the output loss (from 8.7% 
to 17.4%) has an even larger impact (45%). Increasing the assumed deposit withdrawal 
rate from 17% to 30% increases the optimal reserves level from 5.130 million euros to 
6.924 million euros. It is interesting that increasing the term premium by just a little (say 
1 percentage point) has a large impact on the cost of holding reserves27. Increasing the 
term premium from 1.3 percentage points (in the benchmark case) to 2.3 would decrea-
se the optimal level of the foreign reserves by 22%. Figure 13 also shows that, assuming 
that the parent banks act as the lenders of last resort, the actual reserves are still above 
their optimal level under a range of shocks that do not assume their extreme values at the 
same time. For example, providing that the magnitude of other shocks is at the bench-
mark level, the CNB has enough reserves to fight off the crisis with the probability of its 
occurrence larger than 30%. Alternatively, even if the kuna depreciates during the crisis 
by more than 30%, the CNB holds reserves to overcome the higher burden of potential 
foreign liabilities. Finally, actual foreign reserves can be thought of as an insurance aga-
inst a maximum 25% output loss or 50% deposit withdrawal as long as the scale of other 
effects of the crisis is at the benchmark level. 
4 Conclusion
This paper has explored the main issues related to the trend of strong foreign reser-
ves accumulation in Croatia during the last decade within the context of a simple analyti-
27 This might be the biggest weakness of the model then.
Table 8 Benchmark calibration and intervals for the sensitivity analysis





π probability of sudden stop (%) 10.0 2 – 30
∆S exchange rate depreciation rate (%) 8.0 0 – 30
g growth rate of potential GDP (%) 3.9 0 – 10
γ output loss during sudden stop (%) 8.7 0 – 30
r interest rate (%) 3.3 3 –  7
δ term premium (pp) 1.3 0 –  5
φ fraction of deposit withdrawn (%) 17.0 0 – 70
s0
fraction of kuna deposits exchanged for euro 
deposits (constant) (%) 19.0 0 – 70
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cal model. We show that this trend is consistent with the precautionary demand for fore-
ign reserves. Whether this trend has been too strong or whether the actual reserves have 
been lower than optimal depends on the expected reaction of the parent banks during the 
crisis. Our study reveals that for plausible values of parameters, related to the 1998/1999 
sudden stop/banking crisis, the CNB holds enough foreign reserves to fight a possible cri-
sis in the near future. This result holds regardless of the parent banks' reaction. Moreo-
ver, we show that the CNB reserves present an insurance asset against a crisis of a magni-
tude larger than that during the 1998/1999 episode, provided that not all shocks assume 
their extreme values at the same time and that the parent banks act as the lenders of last 
resort. We also show that using the two standard indicators of foreign reserves adequacy 
might be misleading in assessing foreign reserves optimality. This result stems from the 
elements that determine optimal reserves and that Greenspan-Guidotti and 3-months-of-
imports rules do not take into account.
Our model could be extended in many directions. In particular, it would be worth 
exploring the elements of the models by Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) and Jeanne and Ran-
ciere (2008) like crisis prevention (where the probability of a crisis depends on the level 
of reserves) and endogenous agents' behavior during a sudden stop. An interesting issue 
to tackle would be to analyze the relation between profits of parent banks, their behavior 
during a crisis and the probability of a crisis. These extensions would endogenize some 
of the assumptions in our model. Other extensions of the model could include introducing 
parameters related to regulation: optimality of reserves models provide a natural setting 
for comparing the costs and the benefits of regulation, at least from the prudential perspec-
tive. For example, it would be possible to introduce a parameter representing the CNB's 
”minimum required liquid foreign assets" instrument and find its optimal value, in a sense 
that any value of this parameter yielding the optimal reserves level below their actual level 
would be considered costly. All those extensions constitute a task for future research.
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5 Appendix
In the first part of Appendix we show how to derive the consolidated budget constra-
int (14) and (15). In the second part of Appendix, we show how to derive the formula for 
the optimal reserves (17). In the end we show how the consolidated budget constraint re-
lates to the national accounts identity (1) and present a table with our data sources.
5.1 Consolidated budget constraint
Substituting for profits of banking sectors as well as transfers into the budget constra-






Rt = PNt (22)
Canceling out most of the terms and substituting for the reserves equation (22) we 
get consolidated budget constraint given in (14).
During a sudden stop the augmented households budget constraint reads as:
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Rt = PNt  (26)
5.2 Optimal reserves
The optimal reserves formula is derived in the following way. First order condition 
(16) can be rewritten as
 
(27)
where (from consolidated budget constraints (14) and (15))
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After substituting (28) and (29) into (27) and after some manipulation we get (17) 
with the optimal level of foreign reserves given in equation (17).
5.3 National accounts identity and consolidated budget constraint
Here we show how consolidated budget constraint corresponds to national accounts 
identity. Before a sudden stop the consolidated budget constraint reads as:
 
(30)
The first term on the left hand side corresponds to the financial account since it in-
volves foreign borrowing, the second term represents change in foreign reserves as an 
element of the financial account. On the right-hand side we have the difference between 
domestic output and domestic absorption (consumption in our model) and the elements 
of current account that are related to interest rate payments and are therefore stated in the 
income account.
During a sudden stop we have:
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(31)
5.4 Data description and data sources
The table below matches model variables with their data counterpart (the source of 
data is given in parenthesis, where most of the data come from CNB bulletin's table).
Table 9 Model symbols, model variables and sources of data
Symbol Model variable Data counterpart 
yt exogenous endowment 
gross domestic product 
(constant prices, DZS) 
St nominal kuna/euro exchange rate nominal kuna/euro exchange rate (H10) 
Pt price index consumer price index (J1) 
dtfh household euro deposits household euro deposits (D8) 
dtkh household kuna deposits household kuna deposits (D6 and D7) 
bt
foreign borrowing by non-banking 
sector
short term foreign debt by firms (including 
FDI debt, H12) + principal payment by firms 
of long-term debt (H14)
FBt foreign borrowing by banks 
short term foreign debt by banks (excluding 
deposits, H12) + nonresident deposits (D10) 
+ principal payment by banks of long-term 
debt (H14) (-parent banks' euro deposits- 
parent banks' short-term loans) 
FGt
foreign borrowing by the 
government
short term foreign debt by the government 
and CNB (H12) + principal payment by the 
government and CNB of long-term debt 
(H14)
FRBth
foreign liquid assets 
of non-banking sector
cash and deposits in foreign banks of 
households and firms (H19)
FRBtb foreign liquid assets of banks 
(Mandatory) banks' foreign currency 
reserves (H7) 
RBtk kuna reserve requirement kuna reserve requirement (C1) 
RBtf euro reserve requirement euro reserve requirement (C1) 
Rt international reserves gross international reserves of CNB (H7) 
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